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2Executive summarv
It is generally said that firms in developing countries do not have incentives to
invest in pollution control effort because of the weak monitoring and enforcement of the
environmental regulations. This argument assumes that the environmental regulator is the
only agent that can penalize the firm for a lack of pollution control effort, or reward the
firm for good environmental performance or innovation in environmental technologies. It
ignores  that  capital  markets  may  react  negatively  to  the  announcement  of  adverse
environmental incidents involving specific firms (such as violation of permits, spills. etc.)
or positively to the announcement of greater pollution control effort such as the adoption
of cleaner technologies. Hence, the inability of formal institutions in developing countries
to provide incentives for pollution control effort (via the traditional channel of fines and
penalties) may not  be  as  serious  an  impediment to  pollution  control  as  is generally
argued. Capital markets, if properly informed, may provide the appropriate financial and
reputational incentives.
In this  paper,  we  assess  whether  or not  capital  markets  in  Argentina, Chile,
Mexico, and the Philippines  react to the announcement of firm-specific environmental
news. We show that capital markets react positively (increase in firms'  market value) to
the  announcement  of  rewards  and  explicit  recognition  of  superior  environmental
performance; we  also  show  that  capital markets react  negatively  (decrease  in  firms'
value) to citizens' complaints. An immediate policy implication from the current analysis
is that environmental  regulators  in  developing countries may  explicitly  harness those
market  forces  by  introducing  structured  programs  of  information  release  on  firms'
environmental  performance,  and  empower  communities  and  stakeholders  through
environmental educationLprograms.  At the margin, less resources should be devoted to the
enforcement of regulations and more to the dissemination of information which allows all
stakeholders to make informed decisions.
These results may also shed some new light on the pollution haven hypothesis. A
large number of studies have examined the potential impact of environmental regulations
on international competitiveness. Many of these have concluded that pollution intensive
firms  have not  invested  or  relocated  in  developing  countries  to  benefit  from  lower
environmental standards and/or poor enforcement of environmental regulations. Hettige
et al. (1992) observes that "one possibility is that the expected profitability of investment
in  pollution-intensive  sectors  has  also  been  affected by  growing  concern  over  legal
liability or reputational damage" (p. 480). To the extent that capital markets may reward
firms with good environmental performance and penalize firms with poor environmental
performance, the potential  reaction of capital markets  may  explain that  the pollution
haven hypothesis has so far not found empirical support.
31.  Introduction
Thouch  environmental  regulations  have  now been in use for more than 20 years,  it
is increasingly  recognised  that their efficacy in controlling  pollution  emissions  has been
dampened  by a lack of appropriate  monitoring  and enforcement.  Resources  devoted by
various regulatory  agencies  to the monitoring  of emission standards  have typically  been
characterized  as insufficient.'  Moreover,  when  compliance  with the standards  is found  to be
lacking,  it is generally  acknowledged  that fines and penalties  are too low (compared  to
pollution  abatement  costs) to act as effective  deterrents.  In a recent  study of environmental
regulations  in East  Asian  countries,  O'Connor  (1994)  writes:
2
In  several of  the  countries studied here,  the  monitonng problem is
compounded  by weak  enforcement.  In short,  when violators  of standards  are
detected, if penalised at  all  they often face only weak sanctions. (...)
polluters  are exempted  from fines either  on grounds  of financial  hardship  or
because the violators wield undue political influence.  Perhaps the most
pervasive  problem  is that, even when fines  are levied,  they  are frequently  so
low in real terms that they have little if any deterrent  value. In virtually  all
the countries  studied,  there remains  considerable  room  for improvement  on
the enforcement  front.  (p. 94)
It  is  indeed generally said  that firms in  developing countries do  not have
incentives to  invest in  pollution control effort because of  weak monitoring and
enforcement  of the environmental  regulations.  This argument  however assumes that the
environmental  regulator is the only agent that can penalise the firn  lacking pollution
control effort, or reward the firm for good environmental  performance  or innovation  in
See  Russell  (1990).
2  Those  being  Japan,  Korea,  Taiwan,  Thailand,  and  Indonesia.
4environmental technologies. It ignores that capital markets may react negativelv  to  the
announcement  of adverse environmental incidents (such as violation of permits, spills,
court actions, complaints, etc.) or positively  to  the announcement of greater  pollution
control effort such as the adoption of cleaner technologies.
The impact of firm-specific environmental news on market value may work its way
through various channels: a high level of pollution intensitv may signal to  investors the
inefficiency  of  the  firm's  production  process;  it  may  invite  stricter  scrutiny  by
environmental groups and/or facility neighbours; it may result in the loss of reputation,
goodwill, etc. On the other hand, the announcement of a good environmental performance
or of the investment in cleaner technologies may have the opposite effect: lesser scrutiny by
regulators  and  communities  (including  the  financial  community),  greater  access  to
international markets, etc. 3
Hence, the inability of institutions in developing countries to provide incentives
for pollution control effort via the traditional channel of fines and penalties may not be as
serious an  impediment to pollution control  as is generally argued. Capital markets,  if
properly informed, may provide the appropriate reputational and financial incentives.
A limited  number of papers  have analyzed the  reaction of  capital  markets to
environmental news in Canada and the United States. These studies have generally shown
3  See Porter  and Van Linde (I1995)  and Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) for more details.
5that  firms  suffer  from  a  decline  in  market  values -upon  announcetnent  of  adverse
environmental news.4 In this paper, we assess whether or not capital markets in Mexico,
Chile,  Argentina,  and  the  Philippines  react  to  the  announcement  of  firm-specific
environmental  news. To  our knowledge, the current analysis is the first of this nature
performed in developing countries. Even in those countries where it is generally argued
that the environmental regulations suffer from poor implementation, we show that capital
markets react  negatively (decrease in firms'  value)  to  citizens'  complaints targeted at
specific  firms.  We also show that markets react  positively  (increase in  firms'  market
value) to the announcement of rewards and explicit recognition of superior environmental
performance.  An  immediate  policy  implication  from  the  current  analysis  is  that
environmental  regulators  in developing countries may  explicitly harness those market
forces by introducing structured programs of information release on firms' environmental
peformance,  and  empower  communities  and  stakeholders  through  environmental
education programs.5
These results may also shed some new light on the pollution haven hypothesis. A
large number of studies have examined the potential impact of environmental regulations
on intemational competitiveness.6 Many of these have concluded that pollution intensive
In  the United  States,  these  studies  include,  among  others,  analysis  of the  reaction  of markets  to
releases  of the Toxics  Release  Inventory  (Hnamilton  (1995) and Konar  and Cohen  (1997)).  Lanoie
and  Laplante  (1994)  analyze  the  reaction  of  capital  markets  to environmental  news  in Canada.  For
a survey of these  studies,  see Lanoie,  Laplante  and Roy (1997).
We  know of at least  two  such  programs  currently  in  place  in developing  countries:  in Indonesia
(PROPER  Prokasih)  and  the  Philippines  (Ecowatch).  Similar  programs  are  currently  being
developed  in Mexico  and  Colombia.  For  further  details.  see Afsah  et al.  (1996).
See  for  example,  Jaffe  et al.  (1995),  Kolstad  and  Xing  (1994),  Levinson  (1992),  Low  and  Yeats
(1992),  Stewart  (1993),  Tobey  (1990),  Walter  (1992), and Wheeler  and  Moddy  (1992).
6firms have  not  invested  or  relocated  in  developing  countries  to  benefit  from  lower
environmental standards and/or poor enforcement of environmental regulations. Hettige
et al. (1992) observes that "one possibility is that the expected profitability of investment
in pollution-intensive  sectors  has also  been affected  by  growing  concern over  legal
liability or reputational damage" (p. 480). Where traditional tools and actions may have
been unable to create incentives for pollution control, our results give some support to
this  point  of  view  to  the  extent  that  capital  markets  may  reward  firms  with  good
environmental perfornance  and penalize firns  with poor environmental performance.
In the next section, we describe our dataset. In Section 3. we brieflv describe the
event-study methodology used in this analysis to measure the reaction of capital markets
to  environmental  news  (both  positive  and  negative  news).  Results  are  presented  in
Section 4. We briefly conclude in Section 5.
2.  Dataset
The  countries  retained  in  this  study  - Argentina,  Chile,  Mexico,  and  the
Philippines - are countries where stock markets are believed to work reasonably well,
where market capitalization is relatively high and increasing  over time (Table  1), and
where market concentration  is not  an impediment to  conducting  event-study analyses
(Table 2).7
Alhough market concentration may appear to be high, note that the IFC General Indexes represent
only a fraction of total market capitalization. Actual market concentration is lower than suggested
in Table 2.
7TABLE 1
Capitalization of the stock market of Argentina, Chile, Mexico,
and the Philippines, 1990-1994
(in million of U.S. dollars)
Market  1990  ] 1991  |  1992  |  1993  |  1994
Argentina  3 268  18 509  18 633  r  43 967  36 864
Chile  13 645  27 984  29 644  44 622  68 195
Mexico  32 725  98 178  139 061  200 671  130 246
Philippines  5 927  10 197  13 794  40 327  55 519
Source:  International  Finance  Corporation,  Emerging  stock  markets  factbook, 1995.
TABLE 2
Market Concentration in the IFC General Indexes, End - 1994
Market  IFCG Index share of total  10 largest stocks' share of
market capitalization  total market capitalization
Argentina  50.9  41.7
Chile  66.1  46.4
Mexico  63.9  33.8
Philippines  54.4  44.3
Source:  Intemational  Finance  Corporation,  Emerging  stock  markets  factbook, 1995.
For each country, we selected a newspaper which has a large circulation and is of
particular interest to  the business  community. 8 Environmental news were collected  in
each  of  the  countries  over  the  period  1990-94 inclusively.  Once  these  news  were
In the United  States,  the Wall  Street  Journal  is generally  the preferred  source  of information  for
conducting  event-study  analyses.  In Argentina,  environmental  news  were collected  from the
newspaper  La Nacion  (daily  circulation  of approximately  250 000;  ranks  3rd in Buenos  Aires);  in
Chile,  we used El Mercurio  (daily  circulation  of approximately  200 000;  ranks  3rd in Santiago);
in Mexico  City, we used Excelsior  (daily  circulation  of 200 000;  ranks 7th in Mexico  City);
finally,  in the Philippines,  news  were collected  from  the Manila  Bulletin  (daily  circulation  of
300  000;  ranks  3rd in Manila).  All newspapers  were  available  from  the Library  of Congress  for
most of the period 1990-94.  Information  from  missing  issues  was obtained  directly  from the
publishers  of the papers  in the respective  countries.
8collected, we identified those articles involving firms traded in local capital markets. As
shown in Table 3, the number of environmental  news (i.e. newvsclips)  collected in each
country is relatively large (a total of 7 354 environmental news were collected over the
period 1990-94), with Mexico alone representing 47.5% of the total number of news. The
number of environmental news is also  relatively constant over  the period of analysis.
Approximately  20%  of  the  news  involve  specific  firms,  traded  and  non-traded.  As
expected, the number of news involving publicly traded companies is relatively small in
all countries. However, publicly traded companies represent a much larger share of the
number of companies  cited in environmental  news than their  relative numbers  in the
economy. This  may be explained by their  generally larger size, thus being of  greater
scrutiny.
TABLE  3
Number of news (1990-1994)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
Argentina
Total number of environmental news  201  189  168  198  170
With name of non-traded companies  28  32  48  33  27
With name of publicly traded companies  0  0  2  13  15
Chile
Total number of environmental news  309  285  293  282  272
With name of non-traded companies  29  48  43  22  32
With name of publicly traded companies  4  25  34  36  16
Mexico
Total number of environmental news  625  707  759  613  618
With name of non-traded companies  161  143  118  73  88
With name of publicly traded companies  14  25  7  10  8
Philippines
Total number of environmental news  317  309  334  265  266
With name of non-traded companies  54  47  44  47  55
With name of publicly traded companies  8  8  4  9  12
9IEnvironmental  news  were  divided  into  two  groups:  positive  (e.g.  rewards,
investment in  pollution  control, etc.), and negative  (e.g.  spills,  complaints, warnings,
etc.). The sample set is described in Table 4. As can be observed, Chile registered  53
events (environmental news) involving 17 publicly traded firms over the period 1990-94;
20 of those events were positive while 33 were negative. Argentina registered 20 events
(5 positive and  15 negative) involving 11 firms. The Manila Bulletin reported 18 events
(10 positive and  8 negative) with  10 firms. Finally, the Mexican sample consists of 35
events (of which only 4 were positive) involving 10 publicly-traded firms firms. Observe
that the number of events in Table 4 is smaller than the number of news (with name of
publicly  traded companies) in Table  3. This  is the case since a  significant number of
newsclips is simply a repetition or follow-up on an initial event and does not provide any
additional information to what is already known. In most cases, we have included in our
dataset only the announcement of the initial event.
Table 4
Description of data set
Country  Name of firm'  Sector of activitv  Nature and  Number
of Events
Positive  Negative
Argentina  Astra  Oil  l
Ipako  Oil  1  2
Perez  Oil  0  2
YPF  Oil  1  4
Celulosa  Pulp and paper  I  0
Telefonica  Telephone  0
Colorin  Chemical  0  2
Indupa  Chemical  I  0
Molinos Rio  Food  0
Sevel  Metal  0i
Siderca  Metal  0  1
Total  11 firms  6 sectors  5  15
10Table 4 (continued)
Countrv  Name of firm  Sector of activity  Nature  and Number
of Events
Positive  Negative
Chile  Endesa  Electric  3  4
Chilgener  Electric  4  4
CMPC  Pulp and paper  2  I
CAP  Metal  3  4
Volcan  Building material  0
Minera  Investment  0  1
Vapores  Transportation  0  1
Emos  Water  3  I
Puerto  Water  0  1
Victoria  Fabric  0  1
lansa  Food  I
Molymet  Metal  I
Coloso  Fishery  0  5
Iquique  Fishery  1  5
Lirquien  Building material  0  I
Chilectra  Electric  I  I
Eperva  Fishery  I  0
Total  17 firms  10 sectors  20  33
Mexico  Cydsasa  Pulp and paper, oil  1  3
Grupo Maya (A)  Cement  0  6
Grupo Maya (B)  Cement  0  4
Tolteca (Tolmex)  Cement  0
Met-Mex Penoles (A)  Mining  1  6
Met-Mex Penoles (B)  Mining  0  3
Femsa  Food  I  0
Grupo Vitro  Manufacture  I  0
GC3  Cement  0  _
Kimberiy  y Clark  Pulp and paper  0  2
Grupo Bimbo  Food  0  2
Telefonos de Mexico  Communication  0  2
Total  10 firms  8 sectors  4  31
Philippines  Apex Mining  Mining  0  1
Atlas C. Mining  Mining  I  0
Ayala Land, Inc.  Property  0  O
Benguet  Mining  3  2
Jolibee  Food  I  0
Lepanto  Mining  0
Manila Mining  Mining  I  0
Mondragon  Trading  0  1
San Miguel  Food  4  I
Robinson Land  Property  I  0
Total  10 firms  5 sectors  10  8
Complete names of firns  appear in Appendix 1.
11III.  Event-study methodology
The event-study methodology  is used in this  studv to  examine the reaction of
investors to positive and negative news (also called events). 9 The methodology is based
on the assumption that capital markets are sufficiently efficient to evaluate the impact of
new information (events) on expected future profits of the firms. It involves the following
steps: (1) identification of the events of interest and definition of the event window'o; (2)
selection of the  sample set  of  firms  to  include  in the  analysis;'  (3) prediction  of a
"normal" return during the event window in the absence of the event; (4) estimation of
the abnormal return within the event window, where the abnormal return is defined as the
difference between the actual and predicted returns; and (5) testing whether the abnormal
return is  statistically different  from  zero. Several methods may  be  used to  obtain  to
estimate abnormal  returns: the  single-index model  (constant mean  return model), the
market model and the capital asset price model (CAPM) are the most widely used.
The market model assumes a linear relationship between the return of any security
to the return of the market portfolio:
Rif  = a i  +,8 i R,,,  + e,,
(1)  with  E(ej,,) =  O  and  Var(ej,)=-C
9  For  more  details,  see MacKinlay  (1997).
to  The event  window  consists  of the  day where  the  event  occured  (day  0) and  some  days  before  and
after  the  event.
Firms  may  be excluded  if simultaneous  events  are  occuring  within  the  event  window.
12where  t  is the time index. i = 1.2,r  N  stands for securitv,  R,, and R,,,, are the returns
on security  i and the market portfolio respectively during period t,  and e,,  is the error
term  for security i.
Equation (1) is generally estimated over a period which runs between 120 and 210
days prior to the event up to 10 days prior to the event. The event window is defined as
the period from 10 days prior to the event to 10 days after the event. With the  estimates
of  a, and  A3  from  equation  (1),  one  can  predict  a  "normal"  return during  the  days
covered by the event window. The prediction error  (the difference between the actual
return and  the predicted normal return), commonly  referred to  as the abnormal  return
(AR), is then calculated as:
(2)  ARi, = R,, -c-,  R,,
Under the null hypothesis. the abnormal returns will be jointly normally determined with
a zero conditional mean and conditional variance o2  (AR,,):
2  = 0-2  +  I[1  + (R,,,,  2R) 2
(3)  C7  (AR,,  e,
where  L  is the estimation period length (i.e. number of days used for estimation) and
R,,, is the mean of the market portfolio. With L  large, o-2  (AR,,)  ao  e.
13For each individual event, one can estimate the abnormal returri and relevant test
statistics  at each  instant in time within the event  window. However. in order  to draw
overall inference on the abnormnal  return observations for the event(s) of interest,  one can
also aggregate the abnormal returns. For any given subset of N events (or securities), the
sampled aggregated abnorrnal returns (AAR,)  at each instant  t  within the event window
is computed as
IN
(4)  AAR,  =  ,  E  ARj,
For large L,  the variance is
1N
(5)  VAR(AAR, )=
To test for the significance of  AAR,  a Z (or  t)  test can be  derived.
In order to test for the persistence of the impact of the event during a period
(7, - T,  ), the abnormal return can be added to obtain the cumulated abnormal returns
(CAR,  (T,, T2)) for security i  over the period  (T2  - T
(6)  CAR,(,T2)  =  ARj,
T,=
14where  Tu  <  < t < T￿  s Th  E event window,  and  7I and  T,  are the lower and upper
limits of the event window, respectively. Asymptotically (as  L  increases) the variance of
the cumulative abnormal return for security i  is
(7)  0j (T,,T2  (T2 - E  + 1) .
To test the null hypothesis of  zero cumulative abnormal return. one can formulate
a  Z test as  CAR, (T,,  T  )-  V(O,Ci  (T,,  T,  ):
(8)  Z =  CAR  2  AT(Ol)
(0.2  (T  ,T))1
An aggregation of interest can also be performed across both time and events. In
that scenario, the average cumulative abnormal return is defined as:
(9)  CAAR(  ,  T2) = - E  CAR,  ( T;,  T2)
where N is the number of events. The variance of  CAAR  is
(10)  var(CAAR(,T 2))=  N-2  c(T,T 2 )
Under the null hypotheses that the abnormal returns are zero,
15(11)  ~~~~CAAR(T,,.T,)
(var(CAAR(I;,T,  ))) 2
As pointed by MacKinlay (1997,  pp. 24), this distributional result is asymptotic with
respect to the number of securities  N and the length of estimation window  L.
In the next section, we present results obtained from using the single-index model
(constant mean return model).'2
IV.  Empirical Results
We apply the event-study methodology to the environmental events collected in
each of the country over  the period  1990-94. While various  subsets of  firms can be
presented (e.g. by countries, by industrial sectors, etc.), each of those subsets contains a
relatively  small number  of  firms,  and  results  in  each  subset  are typically  driven by
changes in the market values of a limited number of firms. Hence, for the purpose of the
analysis, we first present the results obtained at the most disaggregated level, i.e. the firm
level. This is more likely to  indicate the nature of the events to which capital markets
12  The single-index  model  is a particular  case  of the market  model  described  above.  Where  market
retuns were available,  we also  obtained  results  using  the market  model.  Results  were similar  to
those  presented  here. In fact, Henderson  (1990)  points  out that  the three estimating  methodologies
yield  results  of similar  nature.
16appear  to be more sensitive. In Table 5 and 7. we indicate the nature of events for which
statistically significant increases or reductions in market values are observed.'3
With respect to positive news. it is of extreme interest to note in Table  5 (and
Appendix  2)  that out  of the  13 events  for which  statistically significant  increases  in
market  values  are obtained,  8 of  them  involve  the  report of  an  agreement  with  the
regulator  or  the  explicit  recognition  by  the  regulator  of  a  superior  environmental
performance. That a firn  reports an investment in pollution control (or compliance with
standards)  does not  appear to  impact  capital  markets. Markets appear to  react  to  the
recognition  of  such  investment or  performance  by  the authorities.  For  those  events,
market values increase by more than 20% over the entire event window.
13
Complete  statistical  results are presented in Appendix 2 and 3. Where the length of estimation
period  is too short,  we combine days prior to the event window with post event period starting 30
days after  the event  window.
17Table 5
Positive events
(* indicates a statisticallv significant increase in market value)
ARGENTINA
Name of  Date  Nature  of Event
Companvy
Astra  3/15/94  Investment in environmental protection.
Ipako  2/7/93  Investment in environmental protection.
YPF  12/24/94  Investment  to save birds.
Celulosa  8/3/92  Investment in manufacturing recyclable papers.
Indupa  2/7/93  Company action:  agreement with government for
environmental performance improvement.
CHILE
Endesa  1/31/92  Investment in pollution abatement.
9/6193  Court verdict: positive for the company.
8/8/94  Investment  in environmental protection.
Chilgener  1/9/90  *  Pollution abatement: agreement between company  and
government.
8/5/90  Pollution abatement announcement.
11/9/93  *  Government action: agreement approved by the President of
Chile.
6/23/94  Company action: declaration  of  technical aspects of  the
agreement.
CMPC  2/26/92  Investment in water pollution abatement.
1/7/94  *  Investment realization:  recycling plant to be inaugurated by
the president of Chile.
CAP  8/15/92*  Court verdict: investment  in pollution abatement.
10/2/92  Investment action: use of  equipment for pollution control.
1  1/8/92 *  Government action: recognition of the company's investment
in pollution control equipment.
Emos  4/16/92  Investment  in construction of a waste water treatment plant.
2/24/93  The treatment plant will start working from March 15.
8/11/93  President of Chile will officially inaugurate the plant.
lansa  9/26/93 *  Investment in water pollution abatement.
Molymet  10/11/93  Pollution treatment plant inaugurated by the President of
Chile.
Iquique  8/11/92  Investment in pollution abatement.
Chilectra  5/29/93  Company reward  for environmental performance.
Eperva  7/1/94  Self impact assessment of environment.
18Table 5 (continued)
~~~  ~~MEXICO
Cvdsasa  5/11/92  Investment  in improvement of environment.
Apenol  7/10/93 *  Announcement: existence of pollution control equipment.
Femsa  9/14/91  Agreement with government on pollution abatement.
Vitro  4/18/91*  Investment in environmental projects.
PHILIPPINES
Atlas  10/20/90  The companv has  a representation project since 1970.
Benguet  12/28/92  Government action: mandatory environmental guarantee fund
for the company.
7/19/93 *  Government action: Reward (trophy) for reforestation
program.
2/6/94  Investment in environmental protection.
Jolibee  6/28/94*  Investment in recyclable paper.
Manila Mining  4/17/92  *  Compliance certified by the Environmental Regulatorv
authority of Philippines.
San Miguel  11/5/90  *  Investment in waste  water treatment plant.
2/10/91 *  Government action: praise company for having environmental
concern.
9/14/91  Company action: implementation of reforestation project.
6/8/93  Announcement: new waste water treatment plant.
As indicated in Section 3, it is possible to pool together events and test for the
statistical significance of the average abnormal return for the events thus pooled. Given
the nature of the results on individual stock markets, it is of interest to test if government
actions (e.g. agreements and awards) as a whole are statistically significant. In Table 6,
we have grouped together these government actions and  treated them as a single set of
events. As  can  be  observed,  government actions  as  a  whole  are mildly  statistically
significant on day  +1. However, the difference between  government actions and other
19positive events fail to be  statistically significant. This  may be explained by noting in
Table 5 that 3 individual government actions failed to be statistically significant.'4
Table 6
Government actions vs Other positive events'5
Dav  -1  Day  0  Day +1  Window
Government actions
AAR  CAAR  AAR  CAAR  AAR  CAAR  CAAR
5.080  23.805  -10.627  13.177  14.420.  27.615  9.574
(0.650)  (0.904)  (-1.360)  (0.509)  (1.846)  (1.020)  (0.267)
All other positive events
-2.156  -10.583  -0.846  -11.457  -1.625  -15.488  17.245
(0.176)  (-0.247)  (-0.069)  (-0.255)  (-0.133)  (-0.330)  (0.308)
Government actions Vs All other positive events
7.236  34.387  -9.781  24.634  16.045  43.103  -7.670
0.499)  (0.696)  (-0.674)  (0.475)  (1.106)  (0.796)  (-0.115)
These results  give some  support  to  public information  programs  whereby the
regulator rates and releases not only bad environmental performance but also superior
performance. The results indicate that such recognition does not solely limit itself to an
increase in reputation but also has a positive financial impact on the firm (through an
expected increase in demand brought about by the enhanced reputation, or reduction in
expected  costs,  e.g.  lesser  scrutiny  by  environmental  groups,  communities,  and
regulators).
14  In Argentina:  Indupa  (2/7/93).  In Chile: Emos (8/1  1/93)  and Molymet (10/1  1/93).  In these  last
two events, it was announced that the President of Chile would inaugurate a plant (as opposed to
approving an investment or agreement).
15  For Government actions and All other positive events, the sampled aggregate abnormal return
(AAR) is computed for day -1, 0, and + 1.  The average cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) is
computed for day -10 up to the day. For the event window, the average cumulative abnormal
return is calculated over the period -10 to + 10. Within brackets is the value of the Z statistics. For
Government actions Vs All other positive events, the AAR is here defined as the difference
between the AAR for Government actions and the AAR for All other positive events. The Z
statistics is defined accordingly. ".",  "c", and "*"  means significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively (one tailed-test).
20With  respect  to  negative events  (Table  7),  we  obtain  statistically  significant
decreases in market values especially when it is reported that governments  or citizens




(* indicates a statistically significant reduction in market value)
_  ARGENTINA
Name of  Date  Nature  of Event
Company
Ipako  10/16/92*  Government action: warning about pollution problem.
9/9/93  Accident.
Perez  5/2/93  Government action: warning  for oil spill.
12/12/94  Accidental oil spill.
YPF  1  1/7/93*  Environmental problem (birds killed).
11/30/93  *  Citizens complaint.
1/24/94  Government action: warning.
8/10/94  Oil spill to river.
Colorin  8/2/93  Suspicious transfer of solid waste.
1  1/2/94  *  Government deadline to  companv.
Molinos  9/30/93  Government action: fine.
Sevel  8/2/93  Government Court action against co.
Siderca  11/2/94  Government action: warning.
CHILE
Endesa  i/19/92  *  Government complaint.
9/29/92  *  Warning  from environment ministry.
2/7/93  President's  advice on pollution improvement.
4/21/93  *  Citizens  protests against company.
Chilgener  7/13/90  Government complaint.
1/19/92  Government complains on bad environmental performance
of the company.
4/8/92  *  Environmental accident.
4/16/92  Court action by citizens.
CMPC  9/30/92  *  Citizens complain about solid waste  pollution.
CAPC  4/2/91  Air polluter.
6/27/92  Court action by citizens.
8/8/92  Grace period granted to curb water pollution.
8/12/92  Government supports court action.
Volcan  12/2/93  Govemment black list of polluters.
21Table 7 (continued)
Minera  9/2/91  Court action.
Vapores  6/6/92  Company is fined by government.
Emos  10/17/93  Accident: drinking water contamination.
Puerto  7/23/92  *  Government  complains  about health  hazard  in the vicinity
of the  company.
Victoria  12/2/93  Government black list of air polluter.
lansa  5/29/93  One of the plants ordered to shutdown.
Coloso  4/1/92  Government action: fine.
12/2/93  Government action: company  shutdown for few hours.
2/5/94  Court action:fine.
3/11/94  Government action: company shutdown.
3/18/94  Citizens  complaint:  accident.
Iquique  4/1/92  *  Government  action:  fine.
12/21/93  Government  action:  fine.
2/5/94  Court action:  fine.
3/10/94  Government action (Company closed for 72 hours).
3/11/94  Court  action for bad smell problem.
Lirquien  7/15/92  Government black list of air polluter.
Chilectra  7/11/92  Citizens complain against company expansion.
Molymet  1/19/92  1Governnent  complaint: company major air polluter.
PHILIPPINES
Apex  4/24/91  *  Government  action.
Ayala  12/8/94  *  Government  warning.
Benguet  3/21/90  Government action: penalty.
3/23/90  Workers  dismissals.
Lepanto  10/22/90  Pollution problem resulting in death and illness.
Mondragon  10/11/94  Complaint by citizens about tree cutting.
Robinson Land  6/15/94  Government action: company shutdown.
San Miguel  10/7/94  Oil spill.
MEXICO
Cydsasa  2/16/90  Spill causing death and injury.
3/19/92  Black list of air polluter for company's subsidiary.
10/9/92  Government  action: environrmental  audit.
Grupo Maya (A)  10/4/90  NGO's  black list of air polluter.
3/12/91  Company relocation  requested by Citizens.
3/15/91  Government  action:  warning.
9/20/91  *  Citizens  complaint.
1  1/27/91*  (1  1/25/94): Citizens and ecologists complaint.
7/29/92  *  Citizens complaints.
22Table 7 (continued)
Grupo Mava (B)  3'12/91  Company relocation  requested bv Citizens.
3,/15/91  Governrent  action: warning.
9/20/91  *  Citizens complaint.
11/27/91*  (11/25/94): Citizens and ecologists complaint.
Tolteca  10/14/90  NGO's  black list of air polluter.
2/13i92  Temporary  and partial shutdown.
Met-Mex  3/22/91  Citizens complaints.
Penoles (A)
6/4/91  Company pollution bad record pointed bv a Senator.
819/91  *  Government action: company temporarily shutdown.
3/2/94  Accident: citizens complaint.
3/4/94  Pollution control equipment investigation.
8/27/94  Relocation of 300 families living in the vicinity of the co.
Met-Mex  3/22/91  Citizens complaints.
Penoles (B)
6/4/91  *  Company pollution bad record pointed by a Senator.
3/4/94  Pollution control equipment investigation.
Cementos de  5/25/92  Government action: warning about environmental
Chiguagua  performance.
(GC3)
Kimberly Clark  5/21/92  *  Government action: fine  for water pollution.
Grupo Bimbo  3/19/92  *  Black list of air polluter.
2/14/93  Government action: initiate court action.
Telefonos de  5/21/19  Government action: warning about tree cutting.
Mexico
6/9/94  Government action: fine.
Given  the  nature  of  these  results, we  have  pooled  together  government  and
citizens'  complaints  and  tested  whether  or  not  they  had  a  statistically  significant
differential impact on market values when compared to all other negative events. Results
in Table 8 indicate that they strongly do.
23Table 8
Complaints Vs All other negative events16
Dav -1  I  Dav 0  Day +1  Window
Complaints  (Government  and  Citizens)
AAR  CAAR  AAR  CAAR  AAR  CAAR  CAAR
-1.405  T30.209* 3.137  -27.331*  -1.244  -24.473-  -36.014-
(-0.343)  (-2.335)  (0.767)  (-2.014)  (-0.304)  (-1.727)  (-1.921)
All other negative events
-2.751  T -1.274  [  0.524  [  -1.489  1  2.889  ]  2.680  1  1.1687
(-0.988)  (-0.146)  (0.190)  (-0.162)  (1.047)  J  (0.280)  J  (0.092)
Complaints  Vs All other  negative  events
1.347  -28.934  [  2.613  -25.842-  -4.133  -27.152.  -37.182*
(0.273)  j(-1.853)  (0.530)  (-1.578)  (-0.838)  (-1.587)  (-1.643)
We mav  interpret this  result  by  noting  that  the  filing  of  a  complaint  can  provide
unanticipated news to markets leading them to expect further actions, yet unknown, to be
undertaken. Reductions in market values range on average from 4% to 15%. These losses
are much greater in magnitude than any losses observed in previous studies conducted in
developed countries.  "7
V.  Conclusion
In  this  paper.  we  have  shown  that  despite  a  generallv  acknowledged  poor
enforcement of environmental regulations, capital markets in Argentina, Chile, Mexico
and  the  Philippines  appear  to  react  to  the  announcement  of  environmental  events
involving  publicly  traded  companies.  While  fines  and  penalties  used  by  the
environmental agencies of these countries may have fallen short of creating incentives for
pollution  control,  capital  markets  have  penalised  firms  suffering  from  adverse
environmental events, and rewarded firms with positive environmental news. While we
16  See Foomote  15  for details  of computation.
17  See Lanoie  et al. (1997) for more  details.
24are certainlv not arguing that strong enforcement of regulations should be abandoned and
that  markets  (firns.  consumers,  communities)  be  left to  themselves  to  negotiate and
induce pollution  abatement from  polluters (not  all  firms mav be responsive  to  public
release  of  their  environmental  performance),  these  results  suggest  that  in  numerous
circumstances market forces (even in developing countries) have not remained idle upon
receiving signals of the environmental performance of firms. These results indicate that at
the margin, environmental regulators should devote less resources to the enforcement of
regulations,  and  more  to  the  collection,  analysis,  and  dissemination  of  appropriate,
reliable, and timely information. Further research in this area will indicate whether or not
our  findings  can be  generalised, as  well as  providing a  greater understanding  of  the
mechanisms which underpin the reaction of capital markets.
Moreover,  whether  or  not  firms  have  "voluntarily"  undertaken  pollution
abatement  activities seeking the  obtention  of the reward, and  whether or  not  adverse
market reaction has lead firms to  subsequently invest in pollution control is a  further
issue of investigation.  It  is indeed currently  beyond the realm of our possibilities  to
comprehensively address this issue as it requires a vast amount of firm-level data that is
not  currently available for the countries  studied here. From an anecdotal point of view
however, it is interesting to note, among others, that after Chilgener (Chile) had released
a cloud of toxic air pollution over Santiago and suffered a loss of 5% of its market value
Is  8  Konar  and Cohen  (1997)  have shown  that firms  that  have suffered  the largest  reduction  in market
value following  the release  of the TRI in 1989  have  subsequently  invested  most in pollution
abatement.
25in April  1992. it announced on September 25 1992. an investment of 115 million dollars
to control air pollution.
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Complete name of companies in sample set
ARGENTINA
Astra:  Astra Compania Argentina de Petroleo
Ipako:  Ipako Industria Petroquimica
Perez:  Perez Compane
YPF:  Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales
Celulosa:  Empresa Celulosa Argentina
Telefonica:  Empresa Telefonica de Argentina
Colorin:  Colorin lndustriai de Material Sintetico
Indupa:  Indupa
Molinos Rio:  Molinos Rio de la Plata
Sevel:  Sevel Argentina
Siderca:  Siderca
CHILE
Endesa:  Empresa Nacional de Electricidad
Chilgener:  Chilgener
CMPC:  Compania Manufacturera de Papetes v Cartones
CAP:  Compania de Acero del Pacifico
Volcan:  Compania Industrial el Volcan
Minera:  Compania Minera Tamaya
Vapores:  Compania Sud Americana de Vapores
Emos:  Empresa Metropolitana de Obras Sanitarias
Puerto:  Empresa Portuaria Puchoco
Victoria:  Fabrica Victoria de Puente Alto
Iansa:  Industria Azucarara Nacional
Molymet:  Molibdenos y Metales
Coloso:  Empresa Pesquera Cotoso
Iquique:  Pesquera Iquique
Lirquien:  Vidrios y Planos Lirquien
Chilectra:  Chilectra
Eperva:  Empresa Pesquera Eperva
27Appendix I (continued)
MEXICO
Cydsasa:  Celulosa y Derivados
Grupo Maya:  Grupo Empresarial Maya
Tolteca (Tolmex):  Cementos Tolteca
Met-Mex Penoles:  Empresa Metalurgica Met-Mex Penoles
Femsa:  Fomento Economico Mexicano
Vitro:  Grupo Vitro
GC3:  Cementos de Chiguagua
Kimberly Clark:  Kimberly y Clark de Mexico
Bimbo:  Grupo Bimbo
Telmex:  Telefonos de Mexico
PHILIPPINES
Apex Mining:  Apex Mining Company
Atlas C. Mining:  Atlas Consolidated Mining & Development Corporation
Ayala Land:  Ayala Land
Benguet:  Benguet Corporation
Jolibee:  Jolibee Corporation
Lepanto:  Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company
Manila Mining:  Manila Mining
Mondragon:  Mondragon International Philippines
San Miguel:  San Miguel Corporation
Robinson Land:  Robinson Land Corporation
28Appendix 2
Reaction of Market to Positive News I
ARGENTINA
day  -I  day  0  day + I  Event
window
Astra  3/15/94  2.651  2.705  -0.476  2.229  -1.355  0.874  -7.626
(1.017)  (0.328)  (-0.183)  (0.258)  (-0.520)  (0.097)  (-0.639)
Ipako  2/7/93  -4.107  2.266  -2.819  -0.553  -0.825  -1.378  19.965
(-0.534)  (0.093)  (-0.366)  (-0.054)  (-0.107)  (-0.052)  (0.566)
YPF  1224/94  -4.573  -4.714  -2.279  -6.933  -0.346  -7.339  -7.695
(-0.169)  (-0.123)  (-0.084)  (-0.149)  (-0.013)  (-0.136)  (-0.127)
Celulosa  8/3/92  -2.462  -10.117  0.696  -9.421  0.696  -8.725  -9.984
(-0.425)  (-0.546)  (0.119)  (-0.485)  (0.119)  (-0.430)  (-0.372)
Indupa  2/7/93  -1.106  11.735  -5.145  6.589  0.855  7.444  18.187
(-0.157)  (0.528)  (-0.732)  (0.283)  (0.122)  (0.306)  (0.565)
CHILE
Firmns  Date  AR  CAR  AR  CAR  AR  CA4R  CAR
Endesa  131/92  0.873  2.428  1.029  3.457  -0.861  2.596  8.568
(0.327)  (0.288)  (0.386)  (0.391)  (-0.323)  (0.281)  (0.700)
9/6/93  -0.426  -0.367  -0.031  -0.397  -0.096  -0.493  0.530
(-0.318)  (-0.087)  (-0.023)  (-0.090)  (-0072)  (-0.106)  (0.086)
8/8/94  -0.019  0.839  -0.486  0.353  -1.497  -1.145  -2.388
(-0.015)  (0.213)  (-0.391)  (0.085)  (-1.203)  (-0.265)  (-0.419)_
Chilgener  1/9/90  0.347  6.899  0.596  7.495  1.588  9.083  21.290*
(0.146)  (0.917)  (0.251)  (0.950)  (0.668)  -(1.102)  (1.953)
8/5/90  -3.626  -12.180  -4.386  -16.566  -2.500  -19.066  -21.697
(  ] 350)  (-1.434)  (-1.633)) (-1.860)  (-0.931)  (-2.049)  (-1.863)
11/9/93  2.746 *  7.624-  0.943  8.567*  0.250  8.817*  25.443**
(1.780)  (1.563)  (0.611)  (1.674)  (0.162)  (1.650)  (3.599)
6/23/94  -1.510  -8.549  -1.711  -9.843  -1.343  -8.753  -23.820
(-0.654)  (-0.943)  (-0.746)  (- t.124)  (-0.586)  (-1.245)  (-2.267)
CMPC  2/26/92  1.401  3.346  2.560  5.906  -0.604  5.302  0.755
(0.699)  (0.505)  (1.222)  (0.850)  (-0.288)  (0.731)  (0.144)
1/7/94  -2.523  4.475  1.957*  6.431*  2.980**  9.412t*  25.915'
(-2.188)  (1.227)  (1.697)  (1.681)  (2.584)  (2.356)  (4.903)
CAP  8/15/92  -3.077  -5.639  3.597.  -2.042  0.260  -1.783  0.094
(-1.387)  (-0.803)  (1.621)  (-0.277)  (0.117)  (-0.232)  (0.009)
10/2/92  0.448  (-2.033)  1.430  -0.603  -0.745  -1.344  0.808
(0.261)  (-0.375)  (0.833)  (-0.106)  (-0.433)  (-0.277)  (0.103)
11/8/92  -0.105  2.095  1.544  3.640  2.850'  6.489-  21.613**
(-0.095)  (0.420)  (0.979)  (0.730)  (1.807)  (1.301)  (2.991)
The cumulative abnormal return for day -1, 0 and +1 is computed for day -10 up to the specified day.  For
the event window. the cumulative abnormal return is calculated over the period -10 to + 10. Within brackets
is the  value  of  the  Z  statistics.  ".",  "",  and  ""  means  significant at  the  10%, 5%  and  1%  level
respectively (one tailed-test).
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Emos  4/16/92  -9.544  -13.429  -0.453  -13.884  -2.58  -27.684  -27.684
(-1.797)  (-0.799)  (-0.085)  (-0.788)  (-1.215)  (-1.137)  (-1.137)
2/24/93  1.131  -1.194  -0.385  -1.578  -1.137  -2.175  -12.693
(0.257)  (-0.086)  (-0.087)  (-0.108)  (-0.258)  (-0.178)  (-0.629)
8/11/93  -0.024  -0.169  -0.024  -0.193  -0.024  -0.217  0.919
(-0.006)  (-0.012)  (-0.06)  (-0.015)  (-0.006)  (-0.227)  (0.051)
lansa  9/26/93  -0.727  9.881'  -1.626  8.255  0.170  8.425  21.265**
(-0.345)  (1.483)  (-0.772)  (1.182)  (0.081)  (1.155)  (2.203)
Molymet  10/11/93  -5.500  -15.168  -1.409  -16.577  -1.409  -17.986  -35.849
(-0.704)  (-0.614)  (-0.180)  (-0.634)  (-0.180)  (-0.664)  (-1.000)
Iquique  8/11/92  -5.947  -4.452  -0.437  -4.889  -4.603  -9.492  -13.421
(-1.293)  (-0.306)  (-0.095)  (-0.320)  (-1.001)  (-0.596)  (-0.638)
Chilectra  5/29/93  -1.026  4.499  -1.039  3.460  -0.822  2.368  8.440
(-0.500)  (0.533)  (-0.506)  (0.387)  (-0.401)  (0.371)  (0.897)
Eperva  7/1/94  -2.284  3.093  -4.802  -1.709  -7.642  -9.352  11.877
(-0.491)  (0.210)  (-1.031)  (-0.111)  (-1.642)  (-0.580)  (0.557)
_____  _ MEXICO
Cydsasa  5/11,/92  -0.361  -10.654  -0.3975  -10.783  -1.729  -10.912  -12.558
(-0.129)  (-1.363)  (-0.052)  (-1.299)  (-0.052)  (-1.259)  (-1.109)
Apenol  7/10/93  1.603  0.927  9.979**  10.905*  -1.997  8.909-  11.397
(0.806)  (0.147)  (5.018)  (1.653)  (-1.004)  (1.293)  (1.241)
Femsa  9/14/91  -0.872  -3.102  -2.967  -6.068  1.254  -4.814  -13.125
(-0.247)  (-0.278)  (-0.840)  (-0.518)  (0.355)  (-0.393)  (-0.817)
Vitro  4/18/91  4.863**  11.703*  -4.213  7.490  -1.922  5.498  -8.386
(2.533)  (1.943)  (-2.212)  (1.186)  (-1.046)  (0.833)  (-0.936)
0  X  PHILIPPINES  _  -_  _
Atlas  10/20/90  0.142  0.419  -1.078  -0.658  0.142  -0.517  -10.746
_________  _  _  (0.045)  (0.042)  (-0.342)  (-0.063)  (0.045)  (-0.047)  (-0.945)
Benguet  12/28/92  -0.071  0.049  -8.404  -8.356  -0.071  -8.426  -16.287
__________  ___X____  (0.015)  (0.003)  (-1.773)  (-0.531)  (-0.015)  (-0.513)  (-0.750)
7/19/93  -0.111  7.769  -0.111  7.657  7.581-  15.238  42.271*
(-0.020)  (0.441)  (-0.020)  (0.415)  (1.303)  (0.790)  (1.656)
216/94  -0.107  -3.926  -0.107  -4.033  -0.107  -4.141  -9.660
(-0.019)  (-0.224)  (-0.019)  (-0.219)  (-0.019)  (-0.216)  (-0.389)
Jolibee  6/28/94  0.032  -9.049  0.032  -9.017  4.032-  -4.985  -14.616
(0.010)  (-0.910)  (0.010)  (-0.868)  (1.282)  (-0.458)  (-1.014)
Manila  4/17/92  29.086**  20.201  -8.606  11.595  40.753** 52.347**  107.786**
Mining  (5.211)  (1.145)  (-1.542)  (0.526)  (7.302)  (2.708)  (4.214)
San  11/5/90  1.843  18.210*  0.353  18.563**  -1.097  17.466*  20.663*
Miguel  (Q.696)  (2.199)  (0.135)  (2.138)  (-0.419)  (1.926)  (1.722)
2/10/91  3.688  33.578**  4.651*  38.234**  -2.738  35.496**  48.323**
E________  ________  (1.244)  (3.582)  (1.571)  (3.889)  (-0.924)  (3.457)  (3.557)
9/4/91  -0.342  -7.808  -0.342  -8.150  -1.268  -9.418  -12.389
(-0.120)  (-0.867)  (-0.120)  (-0.862)  (-0.445)  (-0.954)  (-0.949)
6/8/93  -4.008  -43.761  -5.875  -49.636  -5.262  -54.894  -97.839
(-0.059)  (-0.204)  (-0.087)  (-0.211)  (-0.078)  (-0.234)  (-0.315)
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Reaction of Market  to Negative News'
ARGENTINA
day  -I  day  0  day  + I  Event
window
Firms  Date  AR  CAR  AR.  CAR  AP  C.AR  CA.R
Astra  9/10/93  -1.057  8.415  -1.969  6.447  -0.864  5.583  4.333
(-0.385)  (0.743)  (-0.717)  (0.708)  (-0.315)  (0.587)  (0.344)
Ipako  10/16/92  -21.038**  -20.897  0.664  -20.143  28.381  8.238  50.549
(-3.902)  (-0.967)  (0.098)  (-0.893)  (4.171)  (0.350)  (1.621)
9/9/93  3.037  -13.871  -0.167  -14.038  0.1  80  -13.858  -20.347
(0.646)  (-0.889)  (-0.035)  (-0.944)  (0.038)  (-0.850)  (-0.944)
Perez  5/2/93  -1.706  1.876  -0.003  1.873  2.491  4.364  18.290
(-0.374)  (0.130)  (-0.001)  (0.124)  (0.547)  (0.277)  (0.876)
12/12/94  -0.053  0.255  1.439  1.694  0.580  2.274  -14.778
(-0.021)  (0.031)  (0.556)  1(0.197)  (0.224)  (0.254)  (-1.245)
YPF  11/7/93  1.057  -10.942*  2.224  -8.718 *  1.978  -6.740  -8.499
(0.600)  (-1.963)  (1.262)  (-1.491)  (1.122)  (-1.104)  (-1.052)
11/30/93  -0.306  -10.723*  1.519  -9.204-  -1.102  - 0.305*  -14.820*
(-0.171)  (-1.890)  (0.847)  (-1.547)  (-0.614)  (-1.658)  (-1.803)
1/24/94  -1.631  -0.973  -0.710  -1.683  1.564  -0.119  7.406
(-0.964)  (-0.182)  (-0.420)  (-0.300)  (0.924)  (-0.020)  (0.955)
8/10/94  -0.052  -0.522  -0.250  -0.773  -0.647  -1.420  -1.477
(-0.028)  (-0.090)  (-0.136)  (-0.300)  (-0.352)  (-0.223)  (-0.175)
5/15/94  2.692  7.326  2.924  10.250  5.306  15.556  15.461
(0.948)  (0.816)  (1.030)  (1.089)  (1.343)  (1.582)  (1.189)
Color  8/2/93  -5.761  5.786  0.211  5.977  0.211  6.208  15.708
(-0.744)  (0.240)  (0.028)  (0.237)  (0.028)  (0.235)  (0.450)
11/2/94  -0.26-1  -16.840  -3.039  -19.880-  -0.261  -20.141  -37.418*
(-0.056)  (-1.146)  (-0.654)  (-1.290)  (-0.056)  (-1.251)  (-1.757)
Molymos  9/30/93  2.852  7.673  6.798  14.471  -2.159  12.311  34.425
(0.926)  (0.788)  (2.208)  (1.417)  (-0.701)  (1.154)  (2.440)
Sevei  8/2/93  -3.061  -6.476  -1.092  -7.568  -0.061  -7.628  -5.440
(-1.107)  (-0.741)  (-0.395)  (-0.825)  (-0.022)  (-0.796)  (-0.429)
Siderca  11/2/94  2.997  -5.423  1.236  -4.186  -0.167  -4.353  -5.854
(1.394)  (-0.790)  (0.575)  (-0.587)  (-0.078)  (-0.585)  (-0.594)
CHILE
Endesa  1/19/92  -2.112  -13.831  *  -2.326  -16.157*  -2.362  -i8.519*  -9.370
(-0.794)  (-1.920)  (-0.870)  (1.831)  (-0.888)  (-2.009)  (-0.768)
9/29/92  -4.603**  -12.720  1.0401  -11.680  -2.356-  -14.035  -4.419
(-2.612)  (-0.793)  (0.590)  (-0.756)  (-1.337)  (-0.724)  (-0.547)
2/7/93  -1.139  2.971  -0.817  2.154  -0.315  1.893  5.112
(-0.698)  (0.575)  (-0.500)  (0.398)  (-0.193)  (0.325)  (0.683)
4/21/93  1  .505  -1.635  1.837  0.201  -2.000-  -1.799  -12.281**
l_________  (0.980)  (-0.337)  (1.196)  (0.040)  (-1.302)  (-0.338)  (-1.745)
Thecmulative abnormal return for day -I, 0 and +I  is computed for day -10 up to the specified day.  For
the event window, the cumulative abnormal return is calculated over the period -10 to +  I10. Within brackets
is  the  value  of  the  Z  statistics.  "",  "*",  and  "**"  means  significant  at  the  10%,  5%  and  1%  level
respectively (one tailed-test).
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Chilgener  7/13/90  1.305  -1.052  0.294  -0.759  4.524  3.765  1.667
____  __  (0.479)  (-0.122)  (0.108)  (-0.084)  (1.663)  (0.399)  (0.134)
1/19/92  -1.556  -9.914  -0.306  -10.220  -0.306  -10.525  -7.082
(-0.507)  (-1.022)  (-O.100)  (-1.004)  (-O.100)  (-0.990)  (-0.504)
4/8/92  -8.325*  -7.054  5.689  -1.365  -5.316*  -6.681  -6.534
(-2.841)  (-0.761)  (1.941)  (-0.140)  (-1.814)  (-0.658)  (-0.487)
4/16/92  1.285  -12.290.  2.612  -10.308  0.712  -9.595  12.009
(0.432)  (-1.373)  (0.878)  (-1.045)  (0.239)  (-0.931)  (-0.881)
CMPC  9/30/92  -0.041  -9.023*  -2.891  -1 1.921  *  0.018  - 11.903*  -1.349
_  _  (-0.026)  (-1.805)  (-1.833)  (-2.274)  (0.012)  (-2.174)  (-0.186)
CAPC  4/2/91  4.021  5.704  -1.145  4.559  -2.165  2.394  -7.426
(1.682)  (0.754)  (-0.479)  (0.575)  (-0.906)  (0.289)  (-0.678)
6/27/92  0.025  -0.668  0.025  -0.644  1.087  0.444  -1.021
(0.009)  (-0.074)  (0.009)  (-0.068)  (0.378)  (0.045)  (-0.078)
8/8/92  0.472  1.946  -0.384  1.562  -0.925  0.637  2.716
(0.209)  (0.272)  (-0.170)  (0.258)  (-0.408)  (0.081)  (0.262)
8/12/92  -0.944  -0.284  -1.825  -2.109  -0.201  -2.310  2.973
(-0.419)  (-0.040)  (-0.810)  (-0.282)  (-0.089)  (-0.296)  (0.288)
Volcan  12/2/93  -2.862  -28.589  2.138  -26.451  1.900  -24.551  -33.202
(-0.357)  (-1.128)  (0.267)  (-0.995)  (0.237)  (-0.884)  (-0.904)
Minera  9/2/91  -0.477  -2.374  -0.477  -2.850  -0.477  -3.327  -3.942
(-0.171)  (-0.270)  (-0.171)  (-0.309)  (-0.171)  (-0.345)  (-0.309)
Vapores  6/6/92  -1.498  -3.135  0.926  -2.209  0.911  -1.298  0.807
(-0.593)  (-0.393)  (0.367)  (-0.115)  (0.361)  (-0.148)  (0.070)
Emos  10/17/93  -0.148  -1.471  -0.148  -1.619  -0.148  -1.767  -5.799
(-0.038)  (-0.119)  (-0.038)  (-0.125)  (0.038)  (-0.131)  (-0.324)
Puerto  7/23/92  -0.374  -5.464-  -2.160  -7.624-  -0.738  -8.362  -16.892*
(-0.208)  (-1.473)  (-1.203)  (-1.343)  (-0.411)  (-0.963)  (-2.054)
Victoria  12/2/93  -9.895  -42.389  -13.272  -55.661  -10.848  -66.508  -86.081
(-0.502)  (-0.680)  (-0.673)  (-0.851)  (-0.550)  (-0.974)  (-0.953)
lansa  5/29/93  0.500  0.015  0.498  0.513  0.042  0.555  3.279
(0.242)  (0.002)  (0.241)  (0.081)  (0.020)  (0.072)  (0.346)
Coloso  4/1/92  6.961  35.171  -2.988  35.174  -0085  32.089  32.052
(2.165)  (3.459)  (-0.932)  (3.017)  (-0.026)  (2.881)  (2.243)
12/2/93  0.256  16.630  4.359  20.989  0.256  21.245  44.995
(0.087)  (1.777)  (1.472)  (2.138)  (0.087)  (2.072)  (3.317)
2/5/94  0.086  -3.492  -4.460-  -7.952  -4.914.  -12.628  -15.746
(0.028)  (-0.357)  (-1.440)  (-0.774)  (-1.510)  (-1.177)  (-1.109)
3/11/94  -4.860.  1.273  0.140  1.413  0.140  1.533  -12.670
(-1.545)  (0.128)  (0.045)  (0.135)  (0.045)  (0.143)  (-0.879)
3/18/94  ~  0.139  0.741  0.139  0.880  -3.808  -2.928  -13.210
(0.044)  (0.074)  (0.044)  (0.084)  (-1.211)  (-0.269)  (-0.916)
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Iquique  4,1,'92  -0.032  13.750  21.632  35.382  -17.838**  17.543  19.676
(-0.07)  (0.955)  (4.753)  (2.344)  I  (-3.919)  (1.113)  (0.943)
12/21/93  3.895  15.384  0.124  15.507  11.151  26.659  35.137
(0.779)  (0.996)  (0.025)  (0.957)  (2.283)  (0.916)  (1.569)
2/5/94  0.086  25.987  -0.017  25.971  -0.017  25.954  16.726
(0.028)  (1.666)  (-0.003)  (1.587)  (-0.003)  (1.519)  (0.740)
3/10/94  -0.032  18.820  -0.094  18.725  -0.032  18.694  52.526
(-0.006)  (1.177)  (-0.019)  (1.123)  (-0.006)  (1.073)  (2.279)
3/11/94  -0.147  7.126  -0.085  7.042  -3.209  3.832  40.314
(-0.029)  (0.443)  (-0.017)  (0.417)  (-0.631)  (0.217)  (1.729)
Lirquien  7/15/92  -2.509  -23.458  27.491  4.033  0.600  4.633  6.302
(-0.121)  (-0.358)  (1.325)  (0.059)  (0.029)  (0.064)  (0.066)
Chilectra  7/11/92  -0.207  -7.201a  1.065  -6.136  1.133  -5.003  -1.204
(-0.132)  (-1.391)  (0.651)  (-1.130)  (0.693)  (-0.882)  (-0.160)
Molymet  1/19/92  -3.140  -40.617  -9.390  -50.007*  -4.029  -54.036*  . 1 I 943**
(-0.378)  (-1.545)  (-1.130)  (-1.814)  (-0.485)  (-1.877)  (-2.939)
MEXICO
Cydsasa  2,'6/90  -1.661  4.582  0.254  4.448  -0.134  3.928  -1.842
(-0.733)  (0.605)  (0.112)  (0.610)  (-0.059)  (0.567)  (-0.178)
3/19/92  1.591  3.058  1.565  4.623  1.146  5.768  6.671
(0.676)  (0.411)  (0.665)  (0.392)  (0.487)  (0.707)  (0.618)
10/9/92  0.104  11.788  0.104  11.892  -0.396  11.146  13.082
________  _______  (0.040)  (1.414)  (0.040)  (1.394)  (-0.154)  (1.290)  (1.110)
Grupo  10/4/90  -0.176  6.264  -0.176  6.088  -0.176  5.912  7.347
Mava (A)  (-0.045)  (0.505)  (-0.045)  (0.468)  (-0.045)  (0.435)  (0.409)
3/12/91  -0.209  3.875  1.220  5.095  0.073  5.168  29.874
_________  (-0.053)  (0.308)  (0.307)  (0.387)  (0.018)  (0.376)  (1.641)
3/15/91  1.222  5.624  0.075  5.699  -0.207  5.492  30.213
(0.308)  (0.448)  (0.019)  (0.432)  (-0.052)  (0.399)  (1.660)
9/20/91  -1.269  -11.604*  -1.269  -12.873*  -1.269  -14.141  *  -24.845**
(-0.675)  (-1.953)  (-0.675)  (-2.066)  (-0.675)  (-2.173)  (-2.885)
11/27/91  -1.041  -14.545**  -1.041 -15.586**  -0.295  -15.881**  -27.475**
(-0.566)  (-2.500)  (-0.566)  (-2.554)  (-0.160)  (-2.492)  (-3.259)
7/29/92  -1.170  -26.986*  -1.171  -28.409*  -1.423  -31.854  *  -52.891  **
(-0.297)  (-2.069)  (-0.297)  (-2.063)  (-0.361)  (-2.079)  (-2.926)
Grupo  3/12/91  2.737  14.242  1.268  15.511  -0.121  15.390  59.367
Maya(B)  (0.954)  (1.569)  (0.442)  (1.630)  (-0.042)  (1.548)  (4.514)
3/15/91  1.257  13.579  -0.132  13.448  -0.132  13.316  63.416
_________  _________  (0.438)  (1.480)  (-0.046)  (1.412)  (-0.046)  (1.338)  (4.818)
9/20/91  -1.386  -12.392.  -1.748  -14.140.  0.069  -14.4109  -30.332**
(-0.525)  (-1.484)  (-0.662)  (-1.615)  (0.026)  (-1.539)  (-2.507)
11/27/91  -2.688  -I 6.099*  -1.591  -16.193*  -0.094  -16.632*  -29.371  **
(-1.075)  (-1.835)  (-0.636)  (-1.942)  (-0.038)  (-1.870)  (-2.564)
Tolmex  10/14/90  4.594  6.162  9.798  15.961  0.417  16.378  30.047
(1.658)  (0.703)  (3.536)  (1.737)  (0.151)  (1.706)  (2.366)
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MetMEx  3/22/91  4.142  20.674  0.119  20.793  -0.710  20.084  37.335
(A)  (1.992)  (2.789)  (0.057)  (3.104)  (-0.341)  (3.143)  (3.917)
6/4/91  -0.008  23.669  -0.52]  23.149  10.044  33.193  29.115
(-0.004)  (3.370)  (-0.240)  (3.213)  (4.623)  (4.411)  (2.925)
8/9/91  -9.677**  -3.142  -5.239**  -8.388  -0.088  -8.476  -15.193-
(-4.237)  (-0.445)  (-2.343)  (-1.131)  (-0.039)  (-1.094)  (-1.482)
3/2/94  -0.765  1.088  -0.113  0.975  0.107  1.081  0.812
(-0.105)  (0.047)  (-0.016)  (0.040)  (0.015)  (0.043)  (0.024)
3/4/94  -0.134  0.882  0.086  0.968  -0.795  0.173  0.599
(-0.018)  (0.038)  (0.012)  (0.040)  (-0.  10)  (0.007)  (0.018)
8/27/94  0.141  6,067  -0.923  5.144  -0.289  4.854  7.850
(0.020)  (0.268)  (-0.129)  (0.217)  (-0.040)  (0.196)  (0.239)
MetMEx  3/22/91  -2.662  -8.572  3.480  -5.092  9.577  4.485  -16.531
(B)  (-0.284)  (-0.289)  (0.371)  (-0.164)  (1.022)  (0.138)  (-0.385)
6/4/91  -8.985  -28.811  -13.064.  -41.875.  -0.161  -42.036  -43.385
(-0.936)  (-0.949)  (-1.361)  (-1.316)  (-0.017)  (-1.264)  (-0.986)
3/4/94  -0.187  18.743  0.279  18.556  0.046  18.835  25.107
1 (-0.021)  (0.655)  (0.031)  (0.618)  (0.005)  (0.601)  (0.605)
GCG  5/25/92  -3.168  -12.765  9.937  -2.828  -1.820  -4.648  -8.458
(-0.937)  (-1.193)  (2.938)  (-0.252)  (-0.538)  (-0.397)  (-0.546)
Kirnber  5/21/92  0.560  -6.951  -0.565  -7.516  -0.192  -7.708  -55.103**
(0.308)  (-1.210)  (-0.311)  (-1.217)  (-0.106)  (-1.225)  (-6.618)
Bimbo  3/19/92  1.630  -8.763 *  1.972  -6.792  -0.301  -7.092  -22.521**
(0.942)  (-1.603)  (1.140)  (-1.184)  (-0.174)  (-1.184)  (-2.842)
2/14/93  -0.655  4.452  0.861  5.313  -4.139  1.174  -89.247*
(-0.761)  (0.141)  (0.086)  (0.160)  (-0.414)  (0.034)  (-1.950)
Telmex  5/21/93  -0.761  -1.361  -0.436  -1.797  0.883  -0.915  -10.272.
(-0.455)  (-0.257)  (-0.261)  (-0.324)  (0.527)  (-0.158)  (-1.339)
6/9/94  -0.953  -3.065  1.044  -2.021  -1.148  -3.169  -9.840-
(-0.508)  (-0.340)  (0.556)  (-0. 324)  (-0.611)  (-0.487)  (-1.453)
PHILIPPINES
Apex  4/24/91  0.263  -9.810  -14.023*  -23.832  0.263  -23.564  -40.704
(0.035)  (-0.408)  (-1.844)  (-0.935)  (0.035)  (-0.895)  (-1.168)
Ayala  12/8/94  0.024  1.752  -4.201*  -2.449  4.436  1.986  9.238
(0.008)  (0.187)  (-1.415)  (-0.249)  (1.494)  (0.193)  (0.679)
Benguet  3/21/90  -2.217  1.752  -2.275  -0.524  2.664  2.140  3.615
(-0.451)  (0.113)  (-0.463)  (-0.032)  (0.542)  (0.126)  (0.161)
3/23/90  2.634  -1.119  0.134  1.515  0.134  1.649  2.990
(0.538)  (-0.072)  (0.027)  (0.102)  (0.024)  (0.105)  (0.133)
Lepanto  10/22/90  3.388  -3.298  3.273  -0.025  6.391  6.366  5.917
_(1.412)  (-0.435)  (1.364)  (-0.003)  (2.664)  (0.766)  (0.538)
Mondrag  10/11/94  -0.284  -5.824  2.841  -2.983  -0.284  -3.268  3.057
on  _  (-0.087)  (-0.564)  (0.870)  (-0.275)  (-0.087)  (-0.289)  (0.204)
San  10/7/94  0.342  3.589  0.342  3.931  0.342  4.273  4.810
Miguel  _  (0.129)  (0.427)  (0.129)  (0.446)  (0.129)  (0.461)  (-0.395)
Robinson  6/15/94  -1.389  -2.605  1.127  -1.417  -0.139  -1.617  -5.332
Land  (-0.373)  (-0.221)  (0.303)  (-0.120)  (-0.037)  (-0.125)  (-0.397)
34References
Afsah, S., Laplante. B. and D. Wheeler (1996), Controlling Industrial Pollution: A New
Paradigm, Policy Research Working Paper 1672. The World Bank.
Fama, E.F. (1976), Foundations of Finance, New York, Basic Books Inc.
Hamilton, T. (1995), "Pollution as news: Media and stock market reaction to the Toxics
Release Inventory data", Journal of Environmental Economics and AManagement.
28,98-113.
Henderson, G. V. (1990), "Problems and solutions in conducting events studies", Journal
of Risk and Insurance, 42, 282-306.
Hettige, H., Lucas, R.E. and D. Wheeler (1992), "The toxic intensity of industrial
production: global patterns, trends, and trade policy", .4merican Economic
Review, 82, 2, 478-81.
Jaffe, A.B., Peterson, S.R., Portney, P.R. and R. Stavins (1995), "Environmental
regulation and the competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing", Journal of Economic
Literature, 33, 1, 132-163.
Kolstad, C.D. and Xing, Y. (1994), Do Lax Environmental Regulations Attract Foreign
Investment?, Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Illinois,
Urbana, Illinois.
Konar, S. and M.A. Cohen (1997), "Information as regulation: The effect of community
right to know laws on toxic emissions", Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 32, 109-124.
Lanoie, P. and B. Laplante (1994), "The market response to environmental incidents in
Canada: a theoretical and empirical analysis",  Southern Economic Journal, 60,
657-72.
Lanoie, P., Laplante, B. and M. Roy (1997), Can Capital Markets Create Incentives  for
Pollution Control?, Working Paper 1753, Development Research Group, The
World Bank. Forthcoming in Ecological Economics.
Levinson, A. (1992), Environmental  Regulations and Manufacturers 'location choices:
Evidence  from the Census of Manufacturers, Columbia University,  New York.
Low, P. and Yeats, A. (1992), "Do dirty industries migrate?", in International Trade and
the Environment, World Bank, Washington, D.C.
35MacKinlay, A.C. (1997), "Event studies in economics and finance", Journal of Economic
Literature, 35, 1, 13-39.
O'Connor, D.. iMfanaging  the Environment with Rapid Industrialisation: Lessons  from the
East Asian Experience, OECD, Paris, 1995.
Porter, M. E. and van der Linde, C., 1995. Toward a new conception of the
Environment-Competitiveness Relationship. Journal of Economic Perspectives,
9, 4, 97-118.
Russell, Clifford S. (1990), "Monitoring and Enforcement", in Public Policies  for
Environmental Protection, edited by P. R. Portney, Washington D.C.: Resources
for the Future,  pp. 243-74.
Stewart, R.B. (1993), "Environmental regulation and intemational competitiveness", Yale
Law Journal, 102,2039-2106.
Tobey, J.A. (1990), "The effects of domestic environmental policies on patterns of world
trade: an empirical test", Kyklos, 43, 191-209.
Walter, I. (1982), "Environmentally induced industrial relocation to developing countries",
in Environment and Trade: the Relation of International Trade and  Environmental
Policy, Eds: Seymour. J. and T.R. Graham,  Totowa, NJ: Allanheld.
Wheeler,  D.W. and Moddy, A. (1992), "International investment location decisions: the
case of U.S. finns", Journal of International Economics, 33, 57-76.
36Policy Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1883  Intersectoral  Resource  Allocation  and Fumihide  Takeuchi  February  1998  K. Labrie
Its Impact on Economic  Development  Takehiko  Hagino  31001
in the Philippines
WPS1884 Fiscal  Aspects  of Evolving  David  E. Wildasin  February  1998  C. Bernardo
Federations:  Issues  for Policy  and  31148
Research
WPS1885  Aid, Taxation,  and Development:  Christopher  S. Adam  February  1998  K. Labrie
Analytical  Perspectives  on Aid  Stephen  A. O'Connell  31001
Effectiveness  in Sub-Saharan  Africa
WPS1886 Country  Funds  and  Asymmetric  Jeffrey  A. Frankel  February  1998  R. Martin
information  Sergio  L. Schmukler  39065
WPS1887 The  Structure  of Derivatives  George  Tsetsekos  February  1998  P. Kokila
Exchanges:  Lessons  from Developed Panos  Varangis  33716
and Emerging  Markets
WPS1888  What Do Doctors  Want? Developing Kenneth  M. Chomitz  March  1998  T. Charvet
Incentives  for Doctors  to Serve  in  Gunawan  Setiadi  87431
Indonesia's  Rural  and Remote  Areas  Azrul  Azwar
Nusye  Ismail
Widiyarti
WPS1889 Development  Strategy  Reconsidered:  Toru Yanagihara  March  1998  K. Labrie
Mexico,  1960-94  Yoshiaki  Hisamatsu  31001
WPS1890 Market  Development  in the United  Andrej  Juris  March  1998  S.  Vivas
Kingdom's  Natural  Gas Industry  82809
WPS1891 The Housing  Market  in the Russian  Alla K. Guzanova  March  1998  S. Graig
Federation:  Privatization  and Its  33160
Implications  for Market  Development
WPS1892  The Role  of Non-Bank  Financial  Dimitri  Vittas  March 1998  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Intermediaries  (with Particular  38526
Reference  to Egypt)
WPS1893 Regulatory  Controversies  of Private  Dimitri  Vittas  March 1998  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Pension  Funds  38526
WF'S1894  Applying  a Simple  Measure  of Good  Jeff Huther  March  1998  S. Valle
Governance  to the Debate  on Fiscal  84493
Decentralization
WPFS1895  The Emergence  of Markets  in the  Andrej Juris  March  1998  S. Vivas
Natural  Gas Industry  82809
WPS1896 Congestion  Pricing  and Network  Thomas-Olivier  Nasser  March  1998  S. Vivas
Expansion  82809Policy Research  Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPSI 897 Development  of Natural  Gas  and  Andrej  Juris  March  1998  S. Vivas
Pipeline  Capacity  Markets  in the  82809
United  States
WPSI 898 Does  Membership  in a Regional  Faezeh  Foroutan  March  1998  L. Tabada
Preferential  Trade  Arrangement  Make  36896
a Country  More  or Less Protectionist?
WPS1899 Determinants  of Emerging  Market  Hong  G. Min  March  1998  E. Oh
Bond  Spread:  Do Economic  33410
Fundamentals  Matter?
WPS1900 Determinants  of Commercial  Asli Demirg0,-Kunt  March 1998  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Bank interest  Margins  and  Harry  Huizinga  37656
Profitability:  Some International
Evidence
WPS1901 Reaching  Poor  Areas in a Federal  Martin  Ravallion  March  1998  P. Sader
System  33902
WPS1902 When Economic  Reform  is Faster  Martin  Ravallion  March  1998  P. Sader
than Statistical  Reform:  Measuring  Shaohua  Chen  33902
and Explaining  Inequality  in Rural
China
WPS1903 Taxing  Capital Income  in Hungary  Jean-Jacques  Dethier  March 1998  J. Smith
and  the European  Union  Christoph  John  87215
WPS1904 Ecuador's  Rural Nonfarm  Sector  Peter  Lanjouw  MVarch  1998  P.  Lanjouw
as  a Route  Out of  Poverty  34529
WPS1905 Child  Labor in C6te d'lvoire:  Christiaan  Grootaert  March 1998  G.  Ochieng
Incidence  and Determinants  31123
WPS1906 Developing  Countries'  Participation  Constantine  Michaiopoulos  March  1998  L. Tabada
in the World Trade  Organization  36896
WPS1  907 Development  Expenditures  and the  Albert D.  K. Agbonyitor  April 1998  L. James
Local Financing  Constraint  35621
WPS1908 How Dirty  Are 'Quick and Dirty"  Dominique  van de Walie April 1998  C.  Bernerdo
Methods  of Project  Appraisal?  Dileni  Gunewardena  31148